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ABSTRACT
This  paper  discusses  Netsourcing  strategies  for  vendors,  a  little  explored  area  of  outsourcing 
research, using both a resource based (RBV) perspective and a transaction cost economics (TCE) 
perspective. Using both theories and an infrastructural view of IT service, we present a conceptual 
model  of  vendor  sourcing  decisions.  We then present  a  number  of  propositions  based  on case 
studies of vendor decisions. Finally we conclude by discussing the theoretical contribution of RBV 
and TCE and, crucially, the value of combining both theories for the study of Netsourcing, and for 
other areas of IS research.   
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Firm Boundaries
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The term Netsourcing was coined by Kern et al. (2002b, p. 1) as “the practice of renting or ‘paying as  
you use’ access to centrally managed business applications, made available to multiple users from a shared  
facility  over  the  Internet  or  other  networks  via browser-enabled devices.”  Although this  area has 
drawn substantial attention in recent years, it has previously existed in several other formats such as 
Application  Service  Provision  (ASP)  and Managed  Service  Provision  (MSP)  (Jayatilaka  et  al., 
2003;  Susarla  et  al.,  2003;  Tebboune,  2003).   With  the  increase  in  focus  on  new IT sourcing 
strategies such as Utility Computing (Rappa, 2004; Carr, 2009; Armbrust et al., 2010; Brynjolfsson 
et al., 2010), research is coming to a consensus that the future of IT in organizations will be more 
utility-like.  How vendors  take  decisions  in  this  new environment  will  become an  increasingly 
important issue, and this paper looks at the complexity of decisions that vendors need to take in 
such environments.
Much of the previous Netsourcing literature has focused on the customer-side of the model; studies 
such as  those  by Kern  et  al.  (2002a)  and Jayatilaka  et  al.  (2003)  attempted  to  investigate  the 
parameters that potential customers take into considerations in order to evaluate the Netsourcing 
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option.  On the other hand, very little research has been done on the supply-side of Netsourcing; due 
the novelty of the model, most previous research was concerned with its acceptance among the 
business community. This paper examines the decisions made by Netsourcing vendors, with regards 
to  sourcing  the  infrastructural  components  necessary for  them to  offer  their  services.   This  is 
particularly  important  for  some  vendors  who  have  various  challenges  in  deciding  how  to 
differentiate  themselves  in  a  market  where  ‘vanillarisation’ exists,  because they are essentially 
offering the same applications.  Furthermore, to help with understanding these various decisions, 
Transactions Cost Economics and the Resource-based View are used to model such decisions.  The 
two theories are used as theoretical lenses that help to better structure our understanding.
The paper examines the following research questions;
• How do Netsourcing vendors source the infrastructural components necessary for them to 
offer their services?
• How can Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Resource Based View (RBV) theories help 
to anticipate the type of Netsourcing decision by a vendor?
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows;  in  the  next  section,  we  discuss  an  infrastructural  view of 
Netsourcing, then discuss the applicability of TCE and RBV to Netsourcing. We then introduce a 
theoretical  model  of  decision  making  in  Netsourcing.  We  then  discuss  our  methodology  for 
investigating  how vendors  source  their  Netsourcing  components.  We then report  our  results  in 
applying our theoretical model to actual outsourcing decisions by vendors. Finally, we conclude by 
assessing  how  useful  our  theoretical  model  using  RBV  and  TCE  was  for  predicting  vendor 
Netsourcing decisions, and how the interaction between RBV and TCE can be better exploited.
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this review, we first take an infrastructural view on Netsourcing, then we look at two theories of 
the firm – Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource Based View (RBV).
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2.1 AN INFRASTRUCTURAL VIEW OF NETSOURCING
Netsourcing as a phenomenon presented several challenges  to the adopting customers.   Among 
these challenges were customers’ unfamiliarity with the business model, concerns over the security 
of the hosted data, as well as concerns over the reliability of the service provided (Kern et al., 
2002b).  
On the supply-side, however, other challenges can also be found, and it is the supply side that this  
paper  is  concerned  with.   One  concern  is  related  to  the  differentiation  strategies  needed  by 
Netsourcing vendors (Tebboune, 2003); as many vendors attempt to deliver the same applications, 
there is a clear risk of ‘vanillarisation’ - where several identical software offerings are offered by the 
same vendors  and there  is  no unique  selling  point  for  those  vendors.  So vendors  need to  pay 
attention to how they might differentiate their offering in the market. Moreover, the technological 
infrastructure behind Netsourcing can be viewed as a complex technology, where according to Kern 
et al. (2002b, p. 84),  “a Netsourcer’s key capabilities and business areas are the cross-integration and  
management of the various components of the Netsourcing infrastructure, the ultimate goal being a solution  
for  the  customer”.  This  technological  complexity  implies  the  need  to  consider  partnering 
arrangements, and we return to this issue later in the paper.
Looking  at  the  infrastructure  required  for  running  Netsourcing,  the  components  are  generally 
related to networking, hosting, computing architecture, and software (Dewire, 2000; Kern et al., 
2002b;  Toigo,  2002;  Smith  and  Kumar,  2004).   Due  to  the  wide  spectrum  of  the  different 
configurations Netsourcing can take (Kern et al., 2002a; Kern et al., 2002b), it is difficult, and of 
little use, to cite all the capabilities required for its delivery, and thus a more abstract representation 
is needed.  
In a more generic definition, Toigo (2002) presents a classification of the required technologies for 
the provision of IT services, as represented in Figure 1.  Toigo (2002) explains that any IT service 
(such as Netsourcing) requires five different generic components:  data storage,  server,  network, 
application, and management.
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 Data storage provides the required space for storing data, as well as stored data access and data 
sharing, whereas the server component represents the computing infrastructure, which contains the 
hardware used for data processing.  Moreover, the network allows the interconnection and 
interoperation of distributed servers, as well as providing access to applications and data for remote 
users.  The application component represents the programs used to support business processes, 
which vary in many ways according to their use and their architecture, and therefore have direct 
impact on the requirements that need to be met by the other components described above.  Finally, 
the management component deals with orchestration of the other four components; in the case of 
Netsourcing, this is the core component, where vendors need to optimise the interaction between the 
other components in order to ensure a successful delivery.
Figure 1: Infrastructural Model of IT Service (Toigo, 2002)
According to Singh (1997, p. 340), a complex technology is  “an applied system whose components  
have multiple interactions and constitute a nondecomposable whole.”  Singh (1997) further concluded that 
firms commercialising complex technologies face the challenge of developing multiple capabilities, 
but  few  firms  have  the  ability  to  develop  the  broad  set  of  competencies  required.   From 
classifications for an IT service represented in Figure 1, it is clear that Netsourcing requires some 
rather disparate capabilities in order to function effectively, and thus fits perfectly in  Singh’s (1997) 
definition of a complex product. An important challenge for Netsourcing vendors is to be able to 
source all these components to deliver their services, which makes partnering a potentially suitable 
solution for having access to the needed components (Hagedoorn, 1993; Singh, 1997).
Partnering with other businesses who provide various components is not always the only suitable 
solution.   Firms  frequently  consider  the  option  of  allying  against  other  ones,  such  as  “do  it  
yourself”, as expressed by Kanter (1989, p. 184).  In other words, firms have frequently considered 
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the option of performing the required activity internally, against the option of allying with other 
firms that can perform it better.  This has significantly altered the whole concept of the firm, where 
“good fences make good corporations” (Kanter, 1989, p. 183) used to be the main assumption of 
traditional management.  According to Kanter (1989), this assumption has its limitations, in that it is 
costly,  in time and resources, for any firm acting in today’s highly competitive environment to 
perform everything internally, even if it has the capacity to do it.  As a result, competitive success  
became perceived as requiring the integration of multiple capabilities across internal and external 
organizational  boundaries  (Lorenzoni  and  Baden-Fuller,  1995).   Conversely,  partnering  is  not 
always  commonly considered as  a  better  option either,  where according to  Murray and Mahon 
(1993) many firms see them as “potential traps” that may lead to mediocrity.  In fact, several cases 
reported  failed  alliances,  resulting  from  poor  collaboration  between  partners  (Medcof,  1997). 
Several reasons led to such poor collaboration, mainly poor partnering skills, unbalanced intentions 
among the partners, and incompatible business objectives (Dacin et al., 1997).
2.2 THEORIES OF THE FIRM IN IS RESEARCH
Theories  of  the  firm,  as  used  in  IS  research,  may be  helpful  in  understanding  the  issues  that 
Netsourcing firms face. Classically, many theories have been used to investigate firms’ boundary 
choices  (Barney,  1999;  Schilling  and Steensma,  2002;  Odagiri,  2003;  Parmigiani  and Mitchell, 
2009).  However, two of the most widely used are Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 
1975) and the Resource-based View (RBV) (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993); both 
theories have been applied to a great extent in the field of strategic management and to a lesser  
extent in the area of Information Systems (Cheon et al., 1995; Lacity and Willcocks, 1995; Mata et  
al., 1995; Wade and Hulland, 2004; Watjatrakul, 2005; Nevo and Wade, 2010; Alaghehband et al., 
2011; Lacity et al., 2011).  The two theories have, also, seen some strong criticisms regarding their 
usefulness as well as usability in research (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Slater and Spencer, 2000; 
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Priem and  Butler,  2001a;  Priem and  Butler,  2001b)  but  both  still  remain  strong  influences  in 
management and have produced some compelling explanations.
2.2.1 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE)
TCE, originating from the work of Coase (1937), has seen its major development in the work of  
Williamson (1975), who aimed to make the theory more predictive,  particularly concerning the 
transactions that would be organised within the firm (Madhok, 2002).  Williamson (1989, p. 137) 
explains that TCE is consistent with the view that “economizing is the core problem of economic 
organization”.  It takes the transaction as the basic unit of analysis, focusing on economizing efforts 
that attend the organization of transactions (Williamson, 1989; 1991a).  TCE is based around two 
main assumptions: the presence of bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 
1975; Aubert et al., 1996).  At the transaction level, TCE relies on three dimensions, according to 
which  the  transaction  is  described;  asset  specificity,  uncertainty,  and  frequency of  transaction. 
These dimensions help to differentiate between transactions, allowing to decide on the optimal way 
to  perform  these.   Moreover,  if  these  dimensions  pertain  simultaneously,  the  potential  for 
opportunistic behaviour should be taken into consideration (Conner, 1991).  These dimensions are 
described as follows:
• Asset specificity: this describes the ability of an asset to be reused for alternative purposes, and by 
alternative users without diminishing its value (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1989).  In other 
words, an asset is seen as highly specific to a transaction, if it is durable and dedicated to the 
transaction (Aubert et al., 1996).  If a firm, according to Kulkarni and Heriot (1999), possesses 
highly specific assets, than outsourcing an activity to a third party becomes a source of major 
problems, mainly contractual problems.  Therefore, “a firm with specific assets is more likely to  
organize  the  activities  within  its  own  boundaries,  rather  than  into  a  transaction  with  a  
supplier.” (Kulkarni and Heriot, 1999, p. 45)
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• Uncertainty: this  refers  particularly to  behavioural  uncertainty,  including  ‘opportunism’ as  a 
main concern of TCE (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1981; Williamson, 1996; Kulkarni and 
Heriot, 1999).  Potential opportunism is considered on both parties of a contractual arrangement, 
where the sourcing firm may use the sourced technology for purposes other than agreed, or 
conversely the source firm may not provide the agreed level of service (Steensma and Corley, 
2001).  As this behavioural uncertainty becomes more important, the transaction costs increase 
as a result of the transacting parties trying to protect themselves by safeguarding the contract 
(Kulkarni and Heriot, 1999).  Therefore, in order to mitigate such a risk of opportunism, a firm 
may choose to internalise the considered activity through hierarchical control.
Frequency of transaction: this affects the choice of the governance mode enormously.  According 
to  Kulkarni and Heriot (1999), recurring transactions involve continuous bargaining, and thus 
are  considered to be costly.   As a result,  Kulkarni and Heriot (1999, p.  45) concluded that 
“increased  frequency  of  transaction  is  often  associated  with  internalisation  of  economic  
activities.”  On the other hand, in the case of low-frequency transactions, firms would prefer 
taking the  risk  of  opportunism and uncertainty,  instead  of  creating  a  dedicated  governance 
mechanism (Aubert et al., 1996).
As a summary of the three dimensions used in TCE, and based on the work of Williamson 
(1975), Aubert et al. (1996) outlined a framework that combines these dimensions and describes 
the possible solutions (see Figure 2).  From the framework outlined in Figure 2, Aubert et al.  
(1996) explained that when asset specificity is low, market transaction is the optimal solution; 
however, when asset specificity is high, the choice of governance mechanism depends on the 
two remaining dimensions: uncertainty and frequency.  When uncertainty is of a low level, long-
term  relational  contracting  is  preferred;  such  contracts  include  strategic  alliances  and 
outsourcing contracts.  When high levels of uncertainty are present, then internal governance 
should be adopted when the frequency of recurrence of the transaction is high, and relational 
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governance (including strategic alliances and outsourcing contracts) should be adopted when 
transactions are occasional.
Asset specificity
Low High
Uncertainty 
and 
measuremen
t problems
Low
Market 
transaction
Complete contract (long-term)
High Relational governance
Internal 
governance
Occasional Recurrent
Frequency
 
Figure 2: Transaction Cost Framework (Aubert et al., 1996)
2.2.2 RESOURCE BASED VIEW (RBV)
RBV has emerged as an important theory in strategic management (Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Das 
and Teng, 2000; Fortune and Mitchell, 2012; Leiblein, 2011; Doherty and Terry, 2009), examining 
“the link between a firm’s internal characteristics and performance.” (Barney, 1991, p. 101)  It also 
“focuses on costly-to-copy attributes of the firm as sources of economic rents and, therefore, as the  
fundamental drivers of performance and competitive advantage.” (Conner, 1991, p. 121)
It adopts, according to Barney (1991), two main assumptions in analysing sources of competitive 
advantage: it assumes that firms within an industry (or group) may be heterogeneous with respect to 
the strategic resources they control, and that these resources may not be perfectly mobile across 
firms, and thus heterogeneity can be long lasting.
These assumptions came as a critique to the view that resources are homogeneous and fully mobile,  
largely adopted by scholars such as Porter (1985) who focused mainly on analysing the external 
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environment in which firms compete, and the threats and opportunities that the latter might face.  As 
a result,  it  was argued that  “strategy formulation starts properly, not with an assessment of the  
organization’s  external  environment,  but  with  an  assessment  of  the  organization’s  resources,  
capabilities, and core competencies.” (Black and Boal, 1994, p. 132)
RBV relies on four dimensions,  according to which resources are evaluated.   These are:  value, 
rarity, imitability and substitutability (Barney, 1991; Barney and Clark, 2007).
• Value: according to Barney (1991, p. 106), “resources are valuable when they enable a firm to 
conceive of or implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness.”  
• Rarity: rarity is an important condition for a resource or capability to be strategic.  According to 
Barney (1991; 2007), firm resources that are widely available to competing firms cannot offer 
either competitive advantage or sustained competitive advantage.
• Imitability: imperfect imitability refers to the difficulty in reproducing the resources that lead to 
the same advantage achieved by the imitated firm.  This is strongly consistent with the concept 
of causal ambiguity, where although the resources might be reproduced, the link between the 
original resources and competitive advantage is so unclear that the reproduced resources may 
fail to offer the same value.
• Substitutability:  imperfect  substitutability  refers  to  the  difficulty  in  substituting  one  firm’s 
resources for another’s, and achieving the same value, and thus the same competitive advantage. 
This  mainly  is  explained  by  the  idiosyncratic  character  of  these  resources,  where  perfect 
imitation  is  impossible,  and  therefore  the  substituted  resources  will  not  achieve  the  same 
objectives.
We would like to acknowledge at this point that Bromily (2005) has led a number of scholars away 
from this particular formulation of RBV – because of the notion that technology is indeed very 
imitable and substitutable. Consider for instance, Carr’s (2003) statement of IT as a utility like 
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electricity. That said, we consider our conceptualisation of technology in outsourcing as application, 
network, server and data storage (see Figure 1) to be more nuanced. For instance, we would contend 
that  some of  these  elements  are  not  substitutable  or  imitable,  and that  it  is  these  elements  in  
combination that make them so. That said, the bulk of the work we are building does indeed use 
Barney’s  formulation  and  has  been  most  commonly  in  this  area.    mobile,  imitable,  and 
substitutable can be obtained through alliances.”  In  other  words,  a  firm enters  in an alliance 
arrangement with a firm that owns the required resources only if it fails to efficiently source these 
resources from elsewhere (Das and Teng, 2000).  However, rarity as explained by Barney (1991) is 
of prime importance.   Furthermore,  Barney (ibid.) defined imitability and substitutability as the 
ways for a resource to become mobile.  Therefore, for applying RBV to the context of partnering,  
the  main  consideration  is  that  if  a  resource  is  rare,  imperfectly  imitable,  and  imperfectly 
substitutable, then a firm can obtain it through alliances (Barney, 1991; Das and Teng, 2000).
3.0 A THEORETICAL VIEW OF NETSOURCING
In this section, we introduce a conceptual model of Netsourcing, shown in Figure 3. This model 
combines the infrastructural, TCE and RBV perspectives discussed in the previous section.  We then 
use this model to help us discuss, in turn, how the perspectives of TCE and RBV, combined with a 
generic view of infrastructure, might give insight into a vendors Netsourcing strategy.
Figure 3: A conceptual model of Netsourcing
3.1 NETSOURCING AND TCE
Beginning with  asset specificity, most of the components necessary for running the Netsourcing 
model are standardised (Broadbent and Weill, 1997; Bharadwaj, 2000); equipment such as server 
technology has reached a commonly accepted standard that leaves very little difference between the 
various suppliers providing such hardware (Aubert et al., 1996).  This creates very little risk of a 
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lockup effect, particularly from the suppliers’ side.  Consequently, the data storage and the server 
components can be considered to have very low asset specificity.  The network layer can also be 
considered to have low asset specificity. The network for Netsorcing is usually the Internet, and is 
offered by a large number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and telecommunication companies. 
Although networking services are offered in different types and configurations, these services are 
not provided for particular Netsourcing delivery configurations, and are more of a standard nature. 
That said, the human asset specificity in this case is a little higher; knowledge about the application 
architecture,  the platform that the servers run, and the number of users expected to the use the 
application, is important in order to provide optimised networking.  So, even though the network 
layer can be seen as having low asset specificity, we need to qualify this assessment by noting that 
the network is core to the Netsourcing delivery.
The application is core to the Netsourcing model, and represents the basis to the service offering. 
The application is usually highly specific in nature, as it is directly linked to the business process to 
be supported, although, some categories of applications, such as e-mail, might not be as specific. 
Human asset specificity varies according to the type of application being offered.  
In this case, there are two ends of a spectrum; on one hand, an application could be of a general 
character, usually not industry specific, and is horizontally provided in different markets.  Such 
applications are of low asset specificity, as they are not specifically designed and customized to 
particular industries or a particular business process.   On the other hand, applications could be 
industry specific,  targeted at  a specific  vertical  or niche market.   Such applications are  usually 
mission critical, such as enterprise applications (ERP, CRM, …etc.), and therefore tend to require 
in-depth knowledge about the business process being supported.  Such applications are of  high 
asset  specificity as  they are  specifically  designed and customised to  a  particular  industry or  a 
particular business process.
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Regarding the uncertainty  dimension of TCE, data storage, the server and the network components 
are indispensable for the Netsourcing vendor to be able to offer its services.  Although these are also 
of low asset specificity,  they are of prime importance for the proper functioning of the model. 
Unless  these components  are  kept  inhouse  by the Netsourcing  vendor,  contractors’ behavioural 
uncertainty could raise serious problems, which leads to an increase in the transaction costs due to 
the  further  involvement  of  the  vendor.  For  instance,  if  the  contractor  proves  to  be  behaving 
opportunistically in performing regular data backups, the Netsourcing vendor would be pushed to 
increase  its  monitoring,  raising,  thus,  the  transaction  costs.   Therefore,  in  this  case,  careful 
contracting with partners and ex ante considerations, as well as safeguarding measures should be 
considered.
The application, once it is designed and provided by the independent software vendor (ISV), it is 
then run from a server, and therefore at this point, no behavioural uncertainty is apparent.  However, 
the Netsourcing vendor needs support for the offered application, particularly if they chooses to 
outsource it, and thus opportunistic behaviour might rise.  This is further enhanced by the need to 
provide regular application updates,  which is  a core benefit  of the Netsourcing model.   Again, 
careful measures for ex ante contracting should be considered.
Finally, we can consider the frequency attribute and how it applies to the Netsourcing transaction. 
Data storage, server, and network components are necessary to the functioning of the Netsourcing 
model.  Although these are of low  asset specificity, the  frequency of their related transactions is 
high.  Data storage, for instance, is required continuously as the users use the Netsourcing service.  
The  application  component  also  can  be  qualified  as  requiring  high  frequency  of  transactions, 
depending on the application in question.  Transactions with the software contractor are more on the 
support side, where the contractor has to ensure application support, and provide regular updates. 
Therefore, all the layers are considered to be highly recurrent.
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To conclude this discussion, Table 1 summarises the TCE perspective on the key characteristics of 
each infrastructural element of the Netsourcing model.
Element Asset specificity
Uncertaint
y Frequency
Sourcing 
Strategy
Data storage Low High Recurrent Market transaction
Server Low High Recurrent Market transaction
Network Low High Recurrent Market transaction
Application High Low/High Recurrent/Occ. Relational 
contracting
Table 1: A TCE application to Netsourcing
3.2 NETSOURCING AND RBV
What happens if we analyse the components of the Netsourcing model in Figure 1 using the RBV 
perspective?  In this section, we use the RBV concepts  of rarity, imperfect imitability andimperfect 
substitutability developed by Das and Teng (2000) to analyse potential sourcing decisions.  Data 
storage,  server and network components, as explained in the previous section, are standardised in 
the  computing  industry.   Therefore,  there  are  no  particular  idiosyncrasies  attached  with  these 
resources, as they are not directly linked to the business process being supported.  Therefore, these 
Netsourcing  elements  are  not  rare,  not  imperfectly  imitable,  and  not  imperfectly  substitutable, 
which excludes the option of forging a strategic alliance to source them.  
Unless the Netsourcing vendor initially owns these resources, internalising them may see a major 
financial barrier.  In fact, the costs of owning data centres, for instance, are so high that justifying 
the investment might become a major problem.  Furthermore, acquiring the firm that owns this 
resource may lead to internalising other unnecessary and unsuitable resources, which may result in 
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added  managerial  burdens.   Overall,  these  components,  according  to  RBV,  are  better  sourced 
through market exchange or inhouse development, if financially feasible.
The application element illustrates a totally different situation.  The offered application is chosen 
because of its uniqueness.  This is particularly valid in the cases where the application is designed 
and targeted at a specific vertical market, where the resource becomes rare, imperfectly imitable, 
and imperfectly substitutable due to the idiosyncratic knowledge involved. In this case, unless the 
Netsourcing vendor is an Independent Software Vendor (ISV), forging a strategic alliance with the 
application owner is a more valid option. If the application is not designed for a particular vertical  
market, and is more targeted at horizontal delivery, then unless the Netsourcing vendor owns the 
application, sourcing it through strategic alliances is still the most suitable option. The rationale for 
this  is  that  the  Netsourcing  vendor  will  have  to  develop  skills  specialised  in  delivering  the 
application,  which  results  in  the  application  becoming  rare,  as  the  skills  are  not  necessarily 
transferable to other software applications.  An acquisition might be a valuable option if it does not 
lead  to  internalising  other  unsuitable  resources,  such  as  other  applications  not  needed  for  the 
Netsourcing offering.  Internalisation, as an option, is hardly conceivable, due to the time and costs 
involved in developing applications inhouse, as well as the knowledge involved (Armour, 2000).
To summarise the discussion above, Table 2 outlines the sourcing characteristics of the Netsourcing 
components illustrated in Figure 1 using an RBV perspective.
Element Rare
Imperfect 
imitability
Imperfect 
substitutabilit
y
Sourcing Strategy
Data storage No Low Low Market transaction
Server No Low Low Market transaction
Network No Low Yes/No Market transaction
Application Yes Yes Yes Strategic 
alliance/Acquisition
Table 2: An RBV application to Netsourcing
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3.3 SUMMARISING EX ANTE STRATEGIES  FOR NETSOURCING VENDORS FROM 
BOTH PERSPECTIVES
Having applied both TCE and RBV to the infrastructural model of Netsourcing, we are in a position 
to now characterise possible sourcing strategies for vendors (see Figure 4).  The next step of our 
study is to validate these strategies by looking at primary data collected from existing vendors, and 
looking at how actual vendors have sourced their Netsourcing components.  This will effectively 
help  to  compare  ex-ante  findings  with  ex-post.   The  next  sections  of  this  paper  look  at  the  
methodology used for the study,  and discusses some of the findings related to the Netsourcing 
model as well as the use of TCE and RBV in IS research.
Figure 4: Ex-ante sourcing decisions of the Netsourcing components
4.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
For the purpose of understanding how vendors actually source their Netsourcing components,  a 
case study methodology was seen as appropriate because a case study “examines a phenomenon in its 
natural  setting,  employing multiple methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few 
entities (people, groups, or organizations.” (Benbasat et al., 1987, p. 371)
The choice of study cases was determined by the need to explore a variety of cases that represent 
different Netsourcing settings.  The first two cases (Company A and Company B) were chosen due 
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to the differences in their  partnering strategies,  where the former was relying more on inhouse 
provision, whereas the latter was more into outsourcing.  These two case studies were considered, 
by the authors, as representing two ends of a spectrum, and the remaining case studies were chosen 
within  this  spectrum.   The main  challenge  in  this  phase  was  that  not  many firms  accepted  to 
participate in the research, because such decisions could be seen to be commercially sensitive.  A 
total of ten small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) participated in this research, but only six cases 
were used due to the incompleteness of the other four cases; the other four cases were either not 
suitable for the study due to less involvement with Netsourcing than anticipated, or their reluctance 
to divulge important information about their strategies.
The interviews conducted in this research were all either semi-structured or unstructured (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1998) (see Table 4 in the Appendix for more details).  The semi-structured interviews 
were the main source of data, where it was necessary to keep some level of passivity (Walsham, 
1995).  The interview questions were designed around the possible decisions that might occur, using 
the Netsourcing model as a guide. The concepts of TCE and RBV were not explicitly labelled as 
such  during  interviews.  We  also  took  care  to  make  sure  that  our  interviews  allowed  for  the 
discussion of a range of outsourcing decisions rather than prejudging the type of decision that might 
be taken.   
Therefore, the main purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to extract facts from the different 
interviewees,  then  map  the  different  theoretical  concepts  onto  those  facts  subsequently.   The 
unstructured interviews were mainly complementary to the semi-structured ones, and generally took 
place over telephone conversations or during informal sittings.  All the semi-structured interviews 
were tape recorded, and transcribed subsequently.  Moreover, documentation in the form of white 
papers as well as internal reports was used when available.
As an illustration of how the theoretical concepts were mapped onto the interviews, Company A’s 
vice president stated, regarding their data storage component: “… we have a supplier that provides  
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us with storage, but we are in a contract that we signed two years ago, and it is now extortionate  
because a) it was a hype to the bubble, b) hardware costs within have gone to the floor, so we are  
trying to get out of that and we will take on storage ourselves as well…”  
This translates into low asset specificity for data storage; in fact, as admitted by this executive, as 
data storage hardware costs dropped enormously, it became financially possible for Company A to 
internalise its data storage operations.   Therefore, although it  is an important component of the 
Netsourcing model, data storage, in this case, is still regarded as non asset specific.
Furthermore,  the  managing  director  of  Company  C  stated:  “…because  in  our  contracts  we  
guarantee 99% of time of our service, and so obviously we have a very high level of confidence in  
the ability to deliver a reliable product, and their reliability is based on two things, our application  
as well as how the application is hosted…so we have to make sure that USi and us are very much in  
synch about what our requirements are… additionally, we have got what customers require, we  
have certain levels of integration and documentation about the security and the reliability of the  
service…”  This statement clearly demonstrates that although the asset specificity here is very low, 
the company still needs to ensure high standards of its operations, which increases the uncertainty 
and measurement problems associated with these.
The collected data were analysed in two phases.  A within-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) was 
done on a case-per-case basis, where the objective was to compare the predicted outcomes of TCE 
and RBV in Tables 1 and 2 to the actual sourcing strategies in each case study.  Furthermore, a 
cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) was used to analyse the patterns across all the cases, and 
further investigate the explanatory power of both TCE and RBV.
A hosting element was added to both the data storage and server layers as a result of the data 
analysis; although hosting is not included in the initial model in Figure 1, most interviewees made 
the distinction between the hosting and operations for both data storage and server layers, and it was 
judged important to keep this distinction.  
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5.0 FINDINGS 
Our findings in this section are organised as follows: First, we present our within-case analysis. 
Second,  we  present  6  propositions  about  Netsourcing  decisions  based  on  our  findings  in  the 
individual cases as well as in the cross-case analysis.
Data Storage Server
Network ApplicationOperations Hosting Operations Hosting
Ex-ANte Market Market Market Market Market Inhouse/Alliance
Company A Inhouse Alliance Inhouse Alliance Alliance Market
Company B Inhouse Market Inhouse Market Market Inhouse
Company C Inhouse Alliance Inhouse Alliance Alliance Inhouse
Company D Market Market Market Market Market Inhouse
Company E Inhouse Market Inhouse Market Market Inhouse
Company F Inhouse Market Inhouse Market Market Inhouse/Alliance
 Table 3: The sourcing modes of the Netsourcing components in the studied cases
Table 3 summarises the sourcing outcomes from the case studies (a more detailed breakdown of the 
results is shown in Tables 5 to 8 in the Appendix).
One of our most important findings was that RBV and TCE failed to predict almost half of the 
decisions.    These differences could be due to the possibility that TCE and RBV are not powerful 
enough on their own to predict the majority of the sourcing modes of the Netsourcing layers, or 
other unknown factors associated with the context of the decision, that we were not privy to.
However, as a result of the within-case and the cross-case analysis, we could see that a problem 
with our predictions was related to the initial assumptions made regarding the different Netsourcing 
layers.   Our  assumption  was  that  the  software  layer  was  the  most  value-adding  Netsourcing 
component,  and  that  the  remaining  layers  were  pure  commodities,  necessary  for  Netsourcing 
provision but do not carry extra value.  A lot of the published academic work on Netsourcing shares 
this viewpoint.  For instance, Dewire (2000, p. 15) stated that “[a vendor] provides the application  
service as its primary business.”  Although Dewire (2000) recognises the need for the other layers 
of the Netsourcing model, she argued that the main source of value for Netsourcing would be the 
delivered application.  However, Dewire (2000) also predicted that the other Netsourcing layers 
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may start to play a more important role in the future, particularly if the vendor in question owns one 
or more of these layers.  Similarly, Kern et al. (2002b, p. 5) stated that “the primary product of an 
application service provider (ASP) is business applications, managed remorely by the ASP.”  This 
also places great emphasis on the application as being the single most important Netsourcing layer. 
Kern et al. (2002b) also recognise the need for the other Netsourcing layers for successful delivery, 
but do not cite these as being major value drivers.  Additionally, Bennett and Timbrell (2000) also 
define Netsourcing as focusing mainly on delivery of software applications, defining the latter as 
being the ‘scope’ of Netsourcing.
5.1 NETSOURCING STRATEGY PROPOSITIONS 
This section details the propositions that came from our findings.
Several of the studied organizations did indeed find the application layer to be the most important in 
their Netsourcing delivery, as the literature states, but only if they owned the application layer.  For 
instance, the CEO of Company F stated:
 “…the software is an absolutely key ingredient in the solution… as I say prefer a relationship with  
a database provider, who we’re working together very closely, rather than a data centre provider  
because that’s a commodity…”
Moreover, the managing director of Company E also stated:
“… if you own the software you are going to deliver that… I think if you want to set up a business  
[as a Netsourcer] and you don’t own the software, you have very little value I think…”
In the cases of Company B and Company E, their Netsourcing business propositions were simply to 
offer their existing software application as an online service.  Both companies kept their initial  
business  of  selling  and  maintaining  software  applications  in  a  traditional  way,  but  used  the 
Netsourcing model to extend their distribution channel.  Similarly, although Company D produced 
content only, they thought of the Netsourcing model as an extra distribution channel for increasing 
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reach, and thus increasing revenues.  Finally, Company F produced a content-independent 3D user 
interface, and bundled it with content that is sourced from an external content aggregator.  Here, 
again, the idea of using the Netsourcing model was only natural to the company in order to increase 
its sale revenues.  It is also worth mentioning that all these companies – Company B, Company D, 
Company E, and Company F – generate most of their revenues from their non-Netsourcing-based 
business.
Proposition 1: Vendors that own the application layer will  offer value based on the traditional  
Netsourcing definition.
One key finding is that software being the core of the delivery is not always true for vendors.  Some 
other vendors, such as Company A and Company C used different other layers in order to create or 
add value to their businesses.  In the case of Company A, for instance, the application layer was 
sourced from external  third-party Independent  Software Vendors  (ISV).   Initially,  the  company 
started  its  business  as  a  pure  Netsourcing  aggregator,  simply  delivering  the  different  software 
applications in question, using the Netsourcing model on a one-to-many basis.  According to the 
company’s VP of its managed services division, the company was not very successful then as it 
could not distinguish itself in the market, and thus could not attract enough customers to generate 
acceptable levels of revenues, where he stated:
“…when you are a small  company,  what  you have to  do is  be flexible,  and you have  to  give  
customers what they want, and that is what we do…”
It  is  clear  here  that  the  company could  not  generate  enough  value  from its  initial  strategy of 
implementation of the Netsourcing model.  The company rethought its business model in order to 
find ways to generate value.  As a result, the company targeted the network layer as the main source 
of value; they kept the same software implementation skills, and the same application layer, but 
focused on giving customers a unique experience by providing them with services tailor made for 
them, and delivered via vLANs (virtual local area networks) provided by their network provider. 
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Consequently, the company succeeded in setting its business apart in the market, and thus managed 
to attract a healthy customer base.
Company C also generated its value from more than the application they delivered.  The company’s  
main business proposition was a  solution that  is  only achievable using the Netsourcing model. 
Although the whole solution revolved around the application they developed for managing and 
distributing M&As-related digital documents, the actual value that drives its business came  more 
from the network layer, as well as the hosting parts of the their data storage and server layers.  Their  
business relied on the software application to provide an integrated platform for managing and 
distributing  the  digital  documents,  and  thus  the  software  only  helps  the  idea  to  materialise. 
However,  what  is  of  prime  importance  to  the  potential  customers,  according  to  Company C’s 
managing director, is the security of their documents, and thus the company’s focus was mainly on 
making its network and hosting secure and appealing to customers.
This is a major development in the Netsourcing market, whereby value generating can shift away 
from the application layer.
PROPOSITION 2: VENDORS THAT DO NOT OWN THE APPLICATION LAYER WILL  
SEEK TO OFFER VALUE BASED ON THE REMAINING NETSOURCING LAYERS.
The next set of propositions, are considered together, because these propositions draw on both TCE 
and RBV. In this  section we are endeavouring to  explore how combinations of TCE and RBV 
viewpoints can help us build better understanding about the Netsourcing phenomena. 
If we examine Table 3, it is clear that the partnering strategies of those two clusters of companies 
was  rather  different;  Company A and  Company C  relied  more  on  strategic  alliances  than  the 
remaining Netsourcing vendors.  As explained by Kittilaksanawong (2007), strategic alliances are 
particularly valuable for creating value using resources external to the firm’s resources capabilities.
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When we consider how TCE can assist  our understanding of decisions, we arrive at  the above 
proposition. An important phenomenon was seen to be repeated very frequently in the case studies. 
There were a number of instances where the studied firms either decided to integrate or ally for 
transactions  of  low  asset  specificity.   This  is  clearly in  contradiction with  Williamson’s  (1975) 
definition of TCE.  For instance, Company A, Company B, Company C, and Company E all chose 
to produce data storage- and server-related operations inhouse.  All of the interviewed executives 
from these firms confirmed that the reason for insourcing those transactions was mainly to be able  
to take control on the Netsourcing delivery, which translates into higher uncertainty.  Moreover, 
Company C chose to ally with a network provider, although their network layer is of low asset 
specificity.  According to the company’s managing director, that decision was purely to make sure 
that their network is run properly and securely, thus due to high uncertainty.  Finally, Company D 
chose to  internalise part of its non asset specific application layer, and Company F chose to  ally 
with a database provider in order to avoid the performance problems that were encountered by the 
company in the past.
It is important to understand here that in all these instances, the decisions to insource or ally were 
totally based on the uncertainty attribute of the transactions, even though asset specificity was low. 
Thus the uncertainty attribute has played an important role in the sourcing decisions.  However, 
what is not understood is the reason why uncertainty is influencing these decisions.  
As previously discussed in TCE as defined by Williamson (1975; 1991a), the three main transaction 
attributes to be considered when analysing sourcing decisions are asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency of transacting.  However, among these three, asset specificity and uncertainty are the 
main determinants (Williamson, 1989; 1991a; Mahnke et al., 2005).  Moreover, among the latter 
two attributes, asset specificity is the most powerful determinant of sourcing decisions (Williamson, 
1981).  According to Williamson (1985, p. 55), asset specificity refers to “durable investments that  
are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is  
23
much lower in  best  alternative  uses  or  by alternative users  should the  original  transaction be  
prematurely  terminated.”  When  asset  specificity  is  low,  sourcing  should  always  be  from the 
market.   The  rationale  behind this  is  that  in  the  presence  of  trivial  levels  of  asset  specificity,  
numerous suppliers should effectively compete.  However, when asset specificity is present to a 
non-trivial level, the sourcing decision should include the other TCE dimensions – uncertainty and 
frequency of  occurrence.  (Williamson,  1981;  1989;  Aubert  et  al.,  1996;  David and Han,  2004) 
Furthermore, according to Mahnke et al. (2005), this overpowering character of asset specificity in 
TCE has received strong support in internal production vs. external procurement decisions.
Although the application of TCE has been widely in support of the dominance of asset specificity in 
the make-or-buy decisions (David and Han, 2004; Mahnke et al.,  2005), other researchers have 
attempted to  associate  more  power with uncertainty.   Leiblein and Miller  (2003),  for  instance, 
developed a conceptual model in which they argued that uncertainty would lead to integration for 
transactions involving both high and low values of asset specificity in the semiconductor industry. 
However, they failed to prove that empirically, where their results showed that uncertainty leads to 
integration only in the presence of high asset specificity.
When we take an RBV perspective on Netsourcing, the delivery of services relies on many distinct 
capabilities (the different Netsourcing layers) that are hardly possible for one single firm to own 
them all.  Therefore, Netsourcing fits perfectly the definition of a complex service.  Moreover, the 
successful  delivery of  Netsourcing  services  depends heavily on the performance of  each layer, 
where failure in any layer will affect the entire service, no matter how strategic or non-strategic the 
layer is.  Additionally, as explained by Dewire (2000, p. 15), a Netsourcing vendor “is responsible  
for delivering on the customer’s contract regardless of its structure – sole provider or partnered.” 
In the case of Company A, for instance, the main concern was to make sure that the SLAs provided 
to customers are fully met in order to avoid any financial sanctions.  According to the company’s 
VP of its managed services division, the reason for internalising data storage and server operations 
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was to be able to take full control on the service, although those elements were not strategic.  This, 
also,  refers  back  to  the  fact  that  uncertainty,  under  the  TCE explanation,  where  it  seems  that 
uncertainty  emerges  due  to  the  complementarity  between  the  different  Netsourcing  layers. 
However, this is not valued by all the studied firms.  For instance, Company B did not consider 
hosting for the data storage and the server layers to have any uncertainty linked to it.
An important conclusion to be drawn here is that the choice of the unit of analysis under RBV was  
not very appropriate.  Although under TCE the choice of the unit of analysis, being the transaction 
for each of the Netsourcing layers was appropriate; each layer needs a sourcing mode, and thus it  
makes sense to evaluate the production costs and the transaction costs associated with each layer. 
However,  in  the  case  of  RBV,  although  each  resource  is  important  in  its  own  right,  the 
complementarity between these resources is even more important, and in the studied cases, this 
complementarity  has  greatly  influenced  the  sourcing  modes.   Therefore,  the  complementary 
capability of the different layers exceeds that of the individual resources, which might translate into 
what  could be expressed as  a  “Netsourcing capability”.   The Netsourcing capability would be 
important then to consider in addition to the individual components.
Proposition 3: Vendors will internalise or ally for transactions that are surrounded by uncertainty  
due to their effect on the Netsourcing capability.
Proposition 3.1: Vendors will internalise the transactions when it is financially possible, and  
the access to the capability in question is possible.
Proposition 3.2: Vendors will  ally for transactions when it  is financially not possible to  
internalise it, and the access to the capability is not possible.
Proposition 4: Vendors will use the market for transactions that are not surrounded by uncertainty.
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6.0 DISCUSSION
On the theoretical side of the findings of this research, there are several important issues that are 
worth an in depth discussion.  To begin with, from the analysis of the case studies, the following 
was extracted:
• Just over a third of the overall sourcing modes were not explained by either theory.
• Just over half of the overall sourcing modes could not be explained using TCE.
• Just over a third of the overall sourcing modes could not be explained using RBV.
• All the sourcing modes that were explained using TCE were also explained using RBV.
• Some of the sourcing modes that were not explained using TCE, were explained using RBV.
From the statements above, it seems that both TCE and RBV were successful in explaining only 
two thirds of the actual ex-post sourcing modes of the Netsourcing layers in the studied cases. 
However, in analysing the different outcomes of the case studies, the two theories were applied 
independently, and therefore the results are not those of combined explanations.  Another important 
finding  here  is  that  RBV seems  to  have,  in  this  research,  more  explanatory power  than  TCE. 
However, it not possible here to confirm that RBV is a more reliable theory than TCE.  In a highly 
acclaimed research conducted by Lacity and Willcocks (1995), where the researchers used TCE to 
explain IT sourcing decisions, it was found that 87.5% of the cases failed to be explained using 
TCE.  In concluding their research, they stated:  “[w]e hope that this paper serves to stimulate  
debate  among  the  information  technology  academic  community  on  the  applicability  of  using  
transaction cost theory as an explanator of information technology sourcing decisions. We believe  
this debate is important because adoption of theories from other disciplines needs to be critically  
examined within our own discipline.”  (Lacity and Willcocks, 1995, p. 241)  As a response to this, 
part of Lacity and Willcocks’ (1995) results were re-analysed by Aubert and Weber (2001) using 
RBV.  The main finding of this re-analysis was that the same data provided a much stronger support  
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for RBV.  In concluding their research, Aubert and Weber (2001) did not claim support for RBV 
over TCE, but valued the fact that the two theories can be differentiated empirically, and thus they 
compete to explain sourcing decisions.
TCE and RBV have both seen successful and unsuccessful uses in explaining different issues in 
organizations.  Most importantly, TCE and RBV are frequently seen as competing theories (Conner, 
1991; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Das and Teng, 2000), where 
each  has  a  distinctive  explanatory  power  independently  of  the  other.   However,  several  other 
researchers have praised the complementary nature of the two theories (Foss, 1996; Mahoney, 2001; 
Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Barney et al., 2001).  In fact, even Williamson (1991b) recognised the 
usefulness of what he calls “strategising” as complementary to “economising”.
It was explained above that there were issues with both the use of TCE and RBV.  Under TCE, just 
over half of the overall sourcing modes were not explained, however, it was also understood that 
uncertainty, as a transaction attribute, played an important role in several of the sourcing decisions 
made by the different studied firms, particularly those of low asset specificity.  Due to the fact that  
asset  specificity  overpowers  the  remaining  transaction  attributes,  TCE  failed  to  explain  those 
sourcing decisions.  Moreover, under TCE, it was not clear why such uncertainty emerges.  Using 
RBV, it  became clearer  that  the  uncertainty is  emerging from the  fact  that  the  different  layers 
directly affect the overall performance of the Netsourcing delivery, and thus it becomes critical for 
certain  vendors  under  certain  conditions,  to  consider  the  Netsourcing  capability  as  a  whole  in 
addition to the individual layers.
According  to  Leiblein  and  Miller  (2003), “[w]hile  TCE  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  
characteristics of isolated transactions and the likelihood of ex post opportunistic behavior, the  
RBV emphasizes how the opportunity to create competitive advantage by exploiting unique firm-
level  attributes  affects  the  value  of  the  incentives,  administrative  controls,  and  adaptation  
mechanisms  offered  by  competing  forms  of  organization.”  This  is  precisely  what  the  present 
27
research has proved; the studied vendors aim to provide value to their customers.  Depending on the 
source  of  value  in  their  model,  these  vendors  will  choose  different  sourcing  modes  for  their 
remaining layers.  By combining TCE and RBV, in the case of this research, better explanations 
could  be  provided.   For  example,  in  the  case  of  Company  A,  data  storage  operations  were 
internalised,  despite  the  fact  that  asset  specificity  was  low,  because  of  the  high  uncertainty 
surrounding the  transaction  due  to  the  effect  of  that  on  the  company’s  Netsourcing  capability. 
Similarly, Company B internalised the same layer because of the same reason.  However, in the case 
of Company C, for example, they allied with a third-party network provider for the same reasons,  
not only because internalising that was not possible financially, but also because it is a specialised 
capability that is not easily accessible.
Conversely, in the case of Company A, the application layer was sourced from the market, although 
it was of high asset specificity.  Although this case was unique, it could also be explained using the 
same logic; the company did not perceive any uncertainty surrounding the application layer because 
the software applications in question were standardised, but asset specific, packages that are well 
known to the company, and that have already been tested, and thus unlikely to negatively affect the 
overall performance of the Netsourcing delivery.
RBV, as defined by Barney (1991), is a theory that focuses on firm resources as a unit of analysis, 
as opposed to transactions in the case of TCE.  It is mainly a theory of competitive advantage as 
opposed to a theory of economising as in the case of TCE.  RBV has, recently, gained tremendous 
coverage  in  the  strategic  management  literature  (Wernerfelt,  1995;  Barney,  2001) and has  also 
attracted some interest from a variety of other disciplines like IS (Mata et al., 1995; Bharadwaj, 
2000; Melville et al., 2004; Watjatrakul, 2005)  The main tenet of RBV is that in order for a firm to 
achieve and sustain competitive advantage, it must be capable of implementing unique strategies, 
which involve the use of strategic resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; 1991).  Consequently, resources that 
are  valuable,  rare,  imperfectly imitable,  and imperfectly substitutable  are  potentially sources  of 
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sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  However, as explained by Barney (1991),  “the 
study of sustained competitive advantage depends, in a critical way, on the resource endowments  
controlled by a firm.”   Therefore, it is understood that an organization’s strategy depends greatly on 
the resources it owns, and the strategic value of such resources.
Complexity of  products  and services in  many industries,  particularly the technologically-driven 
ones such as IT, is important to consider.  Complexity, according to Tyler and Steensma (1995), 
refers to the diversity of technologies needed for the development process, where the bigger the 
variety of these technologies, the greater the complexity becomes.  According to Ohmae (1989, p. 
145), “[t]oday’s products rely on so many different critical technologies that most companies can  
no  longer  maintain  cutting-edge  sophistication  in  all  of  them.”  Therefore,  an  important 
characteristic of complex products would be the complementarity between the needed technologies. 
Bharadwaj (2000, p. 172), for instance, discussed the strategic value of IT capability and argued that 
“[a]lthough  the  individual  components  that  go  into  the  infrastructure  are  commodity-like,  the  
process of integrating the components to develop an infrastructure tailored to a firm’s strategic  
context is complex and imperfectly understood”
To conclude here, the combination of both TCE and RBV has showed that two parameters play a 
major role in Netsourcing-based sourcing decisions: uncertainty, and resource complementarity of 
the Netsourcing layers (Netsourcing capability). 
7.0 CONCLUSION
This research has attempted to investigate the sourcing strategies of Netsourcing vendors.  Two 
theories  –  TCE and  RBV –  were  applied  in  order  to  predict  the  potential  sourcing  strategies 
employed by Netsourcing vendors, and it was concluded that although each theory, independently, 
could not explain the full extent of the decisions taken by the studied companies. However, when 
these theories were combined, their explanatory power can be improved tremendously. We would 
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contend that this constitutes a unique contribution of our study.  This contribution we feel can have 
some interesting repercussions on IS research, particularly that the latter’s recent focus has been on 
the complementarity of IT-based resources and business processes (Doherty and Terry, 2009).  This 
research also contributes to the debate on the usefulness of the existing theories of the firm in 
predicting  and  explaining  boundary  choices.   Although  recently  some  studies  focused  on 
scrutinising single theories such as Transaction Cost Economics (Alaghehband et al., 2011; Lacity 
et al., 2011) this study takes a different approach by looking at the combinatory power of more than 
one theory.  The impact here is both theoretical and practical; theoretically, the contribution of this 
study is to offer a view on how multiple theories can help to better understand boundary choices, 
particularly in  the context  of  IS outsourcing.   Moreover,  the practical  significance  here  is  that 
managers who are involved in such decisions might find that considering multiple units of analysis 
can help them to make better decisions.
The limitations of this research, however, are several.  Firstly, the data used here are rather small in 
size; although the case studies used here have proved to be very useful, a larger study will help to 
enhance the strength of the results.  Furthermore, the inclusion of more theories such as agency 
theory, and resource dependence theory could help to even further widen the theoretical lens, and 
possibly improve the consistency of the results.
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APPENDIX
Organization Respondent Type of Interviews
Company A CEO Unstructured
VP  of  the  Managed 
Services Divison
Semi-structured
Unstructured
Company B Co-Founder Semi-structured
Unstructured
Manager of the Netsourcing 
Solution
Untructured
Company C Managing Director Semi-structured
Unstructured
Company D CEO Semi-structured
Unstructured
Company E Managing Director Semi-structured
Unstructured
Company F CEO Semi-structured
Unstructured
Table 4: Interviews conducted for data collection
Asset
Spec.
Uncert. Freq. Rare Imp.
Imit.
Imp.
Subst.
Actual Expected 
(TCE)
Expected 
(RBV)
Comp. A
Operation
Hosting
Low
High
High
High
High
High
No
Yes
Low
High
Low
High
Inhouse
Alliance
Market
Inhouse
Market
Alliance
Comp. B
Operation
Hosting
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
No
No
Low
Low
Low
Low
Inhouse
Market
Market
Market
Market
Market
Comp. C
Operation
Hosting
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
No
Yes
Low
High
Low
High
Inhouse
Alliance
Market
Market
Market
Alliance
Comp. D Operation Low Low High No Low Low Market Market Market
38
Hosting Low Low High No Low Low Market Market Market
Comp. E
Operation
Hosting
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
No
No
Low
Low
Low
Low
Inhouse
Market
Market
Market
Market
Market
Comp. F
Operation
Hosting
High
Low
High
Low
High
High
Yes
No
High
Low
High
Low
Inhouse
Market
Market
Market
Market
Market
Table 5: The sourcing modes of the Data Storage layer in the studied cases
Asset
Spec.
Uncert. Freq. Rare Imp.
Imit.
Imp.
Subst.
Actual Expected 
(TCE)
Expected 
(RBV)
Comp. A Operation
Hosting
Low
High
High
High
High
High
No
Yes
Low
High
Low
High
Inhouse
Alliance
Market
Inhouse
Market
Alliance
Comp. B Operation
Hosting
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
No
No
Low
Low
Low
Low
Inhouse
Market
Market
Market
Market
Market
Comp. C Operation
Hosting
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
No
Yes
Low
High
Low
High
Inhouse
Alliance
Market
Market
Market
Alliance
Comp. D Operation
Hosting
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
High
No
No
Low
Low
Low
Low
Market
Market
Market
Market
Market
Market
Comp. E Operation
Hosting
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
No
No
Low
Low
Low
Low
Inhouse
Market
Market
Market
Market
Market
Comp. F Operation
Hosting
High
Low
High
Low
High
High
Yes
No
High
Low
High
Low
Inhouse
Market
Market
Market
Market
Market
Table 6: The sourcing modes of the Server layer in the studied cases
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Asset
Spec.
Uncert. Freq. Rare Imp.
Imit.
Imp.
Subst.
Actual Expected 
(TCE)
Expected 
(RBV)
Company A High High High Yes High High Alliance Inhouse Alliance
Company B Low Low High No Low Low Market Market Market
Company C Low High High Yes High High Alliance Market Alliance
Company D Low Low High No Low Low Market Market Market
Company E Low Low High No Low Low Market Market Market
Company F Low Low High No Low Low Market Market Market
Table 7: The sourcing modes of the Network layer in the studied cases
Asset
Spec.
Uncert. Freq. Rare Imp.
Imit.
Imp.
Subst.
Actual Expected
(TCE)
Expected
(RBV)
Company A High Low High Yes High High Market Alliance Alliance
Company B - - - - - - Inhouse - -
Company C - - - - - - Inhouse - -
Company D Low Low High No Low Low Inhouse Market Market
Company E - - - - - - Inhouse - -
Company F Low High High No/Ye
s
Low/Hi
gh
Low Inh./Allianc
e
Market Market/Al
liance
Table 8: The sourcing modes of the Application layer in the studied cases
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41
42
